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acre limitation, it follows that the conclusion reached by the 
majority that the contract here involved deprives certain 
landowners within the plaintiff irrigation district of vested 
rights without due process of law and without just compensa-
tion is equally unsound and unsupported. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated I would reverse the 
judgment. 
The petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing 
was denied Pebruary l!l, l!l57. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and 
'l'raynor, .J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
[Sac. No. 6489. In Bank. Jan. 24, 1957.] 
MADERA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, v. ALL PEHSONS, etc., Defendants; JOHN 
HUMPHREYS et al., Hespondents; THE PEOPLE 
et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water 
Rights.-A contract between an irrigation district and the 
United States by which the United States undertook to deliver 
water for irrigation purposes from the Central Valley Project 
to the district and to expend funds for the construction of a 
distribution system within the district is ineffective where it 
deprives landowners of the district of vested rights as members 
of the class who are beneficiaries of the trust under which the 
Gnited States acquired appropriative rights to domestic waters 
of the state, deprives "large landowners" of rights to waters 
for their lands in excess of 160 acres, grants the United 
States the right to distribute water for irrigation at a price 
without compliance with laws of the state relating to distribu-
tion of its domestic wateT, reserves to the United States the 
right to determine at its own discretion whether to continue 
distribution of water to the distriet and landowners after 
termination of the contract, and fails or refuses to recognize 
the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties for repayment 
of costs of construction. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 631, 638 et seq.; Am.Jur., Irrigation, 
§ 83 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, §§ 529, 538; [2] Waters, 
§§ 164, 167; [3, 4, 6] Waters, § 171; [5, 7] Waters, § 176; [8-10] 
Waters, § 538. 
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[2] Id.-Appropriation-N otice Under Code: Uncompleted Appro-
priation.-The purpose of Civ. Code, § 1415 et seq., requiring 
posting of notice of appropriation of water, was to afford a 
more perfect protection of water rights than that provided by 
the older method of taking some definite step to divert water 
to beneficial use, and the incomplete right of an appropriator 
of water who has posted the required notice, although not yet 
a title, is an interest in the realty which may be protected. 
[3] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Un-
der Act.-The filing of an application under the Water Com-
mission Act of 1913 and existing provisions of the Water 
Code is comparable and of like effect to the posting and 
recording of notice or commencement of actual construction 
work under the rules which previously prevailed. 
[4] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Un-
der Act.-The issuance of a permit following application for a 
permit to appropriate water does not confer on the permittee 
a fully protected right (Wat. Code, §§ 1450, 1455); the final 
procedural step in perfecting a water right is the issuance of a 
license as prescribed in W at. Code, §§ 1600-1677). 
[5] !d.-Appropriation-Beneficial Use as Limit of Right.-The 
real basis, measure and limit of the appropriative right to 
water is the actual beneficial use of the water. (W at. Code, 
§ 1240.) 
[6] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Un-
der Act.-Neither an irrigation district nor any other appli-
cant acquired a vested right to a permanent supply of water 
appurtenant to lands of the district by the mere filing of 
applications for appropriation of water of a river; such right 
as was acquired was inchoate and incomplete and subject to 
defeasance on failure to perfect it in accordance with law. 
[7] !d.-Appropriation-Extent and Scope of Right.-Under 
Const., art. XIV, § 1, providing that the use of all waters 
"appropriated ... for sale, rental or distribution is hereby 
declared to be a public use," a landowner cannot establish an 
outright private ownership of waters appropriated for such 
use. 
[8] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-A 
landowner within an irrigation district does not possess as a 
part of his freehold estate a proportionate ownership in assets 
of the district. 
[9] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-Own-
ers of lands which were once within an irrigation district and 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 257 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 279 et seq. 
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later properly excluded are not possessed of rights to water 
of the district which theretofore attached to their lands. 
[10] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-The 
trust under which water rights and other property of an 
irrigation district is held by the district is for the benefit 
of a particular class of individuals, namely, the landowners of 
the district as equitable owners, and individual members with-
in that class can demand services to which they are entitled if 
and as long as they qualify as members of that class. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Madera County. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge.* Modified and 
affirmed. 
Proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation 
of a contract entered into by it with the United States, by 
which the United States undertook to deliver water from the 
Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds 
for the construction of a distribution system within the dis-
trict. Judgment for objecting defendants, modified and 
affirmed. 
David E. Peckinpah, Denver C. Peckinpah, Harold M. 
Child and L. N. Barber for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg 
and Adolphus Moscovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, Henry 
Holsinger, Principal Attorney, Division of Water Resources, 
and Gavin M. Craig, Senior Attorney, for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Roy A. Gustafson, District Attorney (Ventura), James E. 
Dixon, Deputy District Attorney, .J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor 
General of the United States, Perry \V. Morton, Assistant At-
torney General, David R. Warner and Roger P. Marquis, 
Attorneys, Department of .T ustiee, t as Amiei Curiae on brhalf 
of Appellants. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
tReporter's Note: The attorneys for the Federal Department of Jus-
tice participated in the trial comt proceedings as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of the plaintiff district. They filed no briefs and dirl not otherwisP 
participate on appeal except that as Amici Curiae they fikd a memo-
randum in support of the petition for a rehearing. 
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Harry W. Horton, Horton & Knox, Denslow Green, Green, 
Green & Plumley, Chester R. A~ndrews, Mason A. Bailey, 
Coffee & Wolfe, Dowell & Thompson, Sherwood Green and 
Green, Green & Bartow for Respondents. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J. 
Rockwell and John M. Naff, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the plaintiff Madera 
Irrigation District and certain of the defendants from a 
judgment refusing to confirm a proposed contract between 
the United States, acting by and through the Bureau of 
Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and the 
plaintiff district. The contract is substantially the same as 
that considered in the companion case of Ivanhoe hr. Dist. 
v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], this day de-
cided. Except as to certain matters hereinafter referred 
to the issues are also the same as in that case. 
As in the Ivanhoe contract the United States undertook 
to deliver water for irrigation purposes from the Central 
Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for the 
construction of a distribution system within the district. 
'rhis proceeding, also an in rem special proceeding to obtain 
the confirmation of the proposed contract, was brought by 
the district pursuant to the provisions of sections 22670 et seq. 
and section 23225 of the Water Code. The federal law 
(Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, § 46, 44 Stats. 649, 650, 
43 U.S.O. § 423e, Federal Reclamation Laws Ann. 318-319) 
and article 36 of the contract require the validity or in-
validity thereof to be determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The contract in question was entered into on 
May 14, 1951, by the district acting under the Irrigation 
District Federal Cooperation Law. (Wat. Code, §§ 23175 
et seq.) On the 26th of March, 1951, the California Distriets 
Securities Commission, with reservations, approved the con-
tract (W at. Code, § § 23222, 24253), and the electors of the 
district subsequently approved it by a vote of 1979 to 755 
(Wat. Code, §§ 23220. 23221, 21925-21935). The district 
commenced this proceeding on the 21st day of May, 1951. 
Eighty-six landowners within the district, and four land-
owners outside of the district filed answers in which they 
opposed the confirmation of the contract. The State of Cali-
fornia and the Water Project Authority of the State of 
California, by and through the attorney general, filed a joint 
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ansvver. The state prayed that the contract be vali(lated and 
a separate prayer recited that tile Water Project Authority 
"is not taking any position upon the validity of the contract" 
and requested the court to declare that its decree "does not 
pnrport to be an adjudication of the right or interest of the 
State of California or its agencies ... or of the right or 
interest of the United States or its agencies ... in or to 
1 he water or water rights ... involved in the Central Valley 
Project.'' 
Aft('r the time for filing an answer had expired, 
h'ave of thl' court was granted the State Engineer of the State 
of California, aeting in his capacity as such and ex-officio 
as Chief of the Division of Water Resources, Department of 
Public \Yorks, to file a separate answer by counsel for the 
Division of \Yater Resources. The State Engineer took no 
position as to the validity of the contract, stating that his 
objeet was to proteet the state law relating to water use 
and control. Regional counsel for the Bureau of Reclamation 
of the Department of the Interior were granted leave by the 
court to appear as amici curiae and as such participated 
throughout the proceedings in the trial court in support of 
the confirmation of the contract. 
Judgment was ordered in favor of the objecting defendants 
and the court specifically directed that findings of fact and 
conclusions of law be prepared in accordance with the views 
of the same court in the Ivanhoe case. However, additional 
findings and conclusions hereinafter referred to were made 
on issues not involved in the Ivanhoe case. The judgment 
included injunctive provisions similar to those in the Ivanhoe 
case except that it expressly provided that "The delivery of 
water by the United States to the plaintiff District at charges 
not to exceed $3.50 per acre foot for Class 1 water and $1.50 
per acre foot for Class 2 water, and the collection of funds 
therefor, and the payment for the costs thereof by plaintiff 
district to the United States is not enjoined." 
The appellants are the State of California represented by 
the attorney general who seeks a reversal of the judgment, 
the plaintiff district which seeks a reversal, and the State 
Engineer as Chief of the Division of Water Resources of the 
Department of Public \Vorks who asserts the invalidity of 
the contract but contends that the trial court erred in a 
determination that a right to the use of water is acquired 
by duly filing an application to appropriate water without 
perfecting it. The respondents, who seek an affirmance of the 
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judgment, are supported by the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation 
as amicus curiae. The Ventura County Flood Control Dis-
trict has appeared as amicus curiae in support of the appel-
lants and seeks to establish that the trial court's determination 
that water rights involved have become appurtenant to the 
lands upon which water is being or is to be used is not in 
accordance with existing law. 
The Madera Irrigation District is located in Madera County. 
It now has an area of approximately 112,000 acres, of which 
about 85,000 acres have been developed for irrigation. Be-
fore project water became available 90 per cent of the acreage 
irrigated was supplied with water pumped from an under-
ground water supply. During the 25-year period from 1922 
through 1946 the demand on that supply exceeded the natural 
supply by an average of 27,200 acre feet annually and re-
sulted in a net lowering of the water table by 21.7 feet. The 
need of a supplemental supply of water was thus apparent. 
Shortly after its organization the district in 1920 developed 
preliminary plans for the construction of a storage dam on 
the San Joaquin River near Friant and a canal to deliver 
water stored therein to lands within the district. It acquired 
a suitable dam site and gravel needed in the construction. 
It filed applications with the Division of Water Resources to 
appropriate unappropriated water of the San Joaquin River. 
Plans for construction of the dam were never completed by 
the district apparently because litigation between Miller and 
Lux and the Madera Irrigation District established that there 
was insufficient unappropriated water in the San Joaquin 
River to sustain the proposed project. 
In May, 1939, the district entered into a contract with 
the United States whereby it transferred its dam site, gravel 
lands and applications to the United States for use in con-
nection with the Central Valley Project. In exchange the 
district received $300,000 and a permanent priority right to 
contract for an annual supply of water from the project. 
Part A of the contract now under consideration is in partial 
recognition of that right. 
The contract in Part A provides for a designated water 
supply for the district from the Friant Dam and the Madera 
Canal for a period of 40 years, commencing with the year in 
which the initial delivery date occurs. The United States 
agrees to furnish to the district, and the district agrees to 
accept and pay for the water supplied at rates whose maxi-
mum limits are fixed by the contract. Part B of the contract 
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provides that, to the extent that funds may be available by 
appropriation, the United States will construct a distribution 
system to cost not exceeding $8,320,000. The system will be 
constructed so as to provide facilities for the delivery of 
water from the Madera Canal to each unit of irrigable land 
within the district, each unit in no event to comprise more 
than 160 acres of land. The district agrees to convey to the 
United States without coRt the unencumbered fee simple title 
to any land owned by the district, or perpetual easements 
therein, required for right of way purposes for the distribution 
system. Title to all the project works, including the dis-
tribution system, is to be and remain in the name of the 
United States until otherwise provided for by the Congress, 
notwithstanding the transfer of any such works to the district 
for operation and maintenance. The district must repay 
to the United States the actual cost of the distribution system. 
The obligation is to be paid in 40 successive, equal annual 
installments, the first of which shall become due in the year 
following a two-year development period after the year in 
which the system shall become available for use. At the 
commencement of the development period the district will 
take over and at its own expense operate and maintain the 
distribution system, subject to the right of the United States 
to take possession of the system upon the failure of the dis-
trict to perform its contractual obligations. 
The above provisions of the contract with reference to 
cost, work, land limitation and payment by the district are 
substantially the same as those in the Ivanhoe contract. 
There are, however, two additional provisions in the con-
tract here involved which recognize and modify the terms 
of the 1939 contract, by which the district conveyed the 
Friant Dam site and other interests to the United States. 
Article 2 of the present contract modifies and adjusts the 
amount of water to which the district might have asesrted a 
priority right under the 1939 contract, and article 4 states 
that the present contract is in satisfaction of this right only 
for its 40-year term, after which it may be extended, as 
distinguished from the Ivanhoe contract wherein the United 
States did not undertake to supply water beyond the 40-year 
term of the contract. 
[1] For reasons stated in the Ivanhoe ease the contract 
in the present case is ineffective in tl1at it purports to de-
prive the landowners of the plaintiff district of vested rights 
as members of the class who are the beneficiaries of the trust 
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under which the United States acquired appropriative rights 
to the domestic waters of this state; in that it seeks to 
deprive so-called "large landowners" of rights to waters 
for their lands in excess of 160 acres although such landowners 
arc qualified members of the class who are the beneficiaries 
under the declared trust, and who are denied thereby due 
process and equal proteetion of the laws; in that it, by impli-
cation or otherwise, purports to grant to the United States 
the right to distribute \Yater for irrigation at a price without 
compliance with the laws of this state relating to the dis-
tribution of its domestic water; in that it, or to the extent 
that it, by implication or otherwise, reserves to the United 
States the right to determine at its own discretion whether 
to continue the distribution of water to the plaintiff district 
and landowners therein after the termination of the present 
contract, and in that it by implication or otherwise fails or 
refuses to recognize the debtor-creditor relationship of the 
parties for repayment of costs of construction of the storage 
and distribution system. 
In addition to the foregoing there are other issues which 
are not included within the determinations in the Ivanhoe 
ease. The first of these relates to the nature of rights which 
accrue by the filing of an application to appropriate water, 
and particularly whether the district and its landowners have 
additional rights arising from the district's applications 
for the appropriation of water on the San Joaquin River 
at the time it contemplated construction of a dam at Friant. 
The applications, filed in the 1920's, were never perfected; no 
works pursuant thereto were ever built, no water was ever 
diverted, and no permit or license was ever obtained. 
As a part of its judgment the trial court in several in-
stances held that an application for the appropriation of un-
appropriated water from a particular source resulted in a 
vested right in the applicants to a permanent supply of 
water from that source. In the Ivanhoe case it was con-
cluded that the rights acquired under an application by the 
state or its assignee or by the United States to appropriate 
the domestic waters of the state for a beneficial use did not 
confer a vested right in the persons for whose benefit the 
application was made in the sense that such right became a 
part and parcel of the freehold estate. It is contended 
by the State Engineer in the present case that the right created 
by the application itself is an incomplete, incipient and con-
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ditional right in and to the water applied for. With this 
contention we agree. 
Prior to legislation upon the subject, no priority of right 
to the use of water could be acquired in advance of the 
taking of the first definite step to divert water to beneficial 
use. \Vhen work was finally completed and the water applied 
to beneficial use, a right vested in and to the use of the 
water which "related back" for priority to the time when the 
claim was made, the location was selected, and work was com-
menced looking toward the conveyance of a definite amount 
of water from a definite source to the place of its intended 
use. (Nevada etc. Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282; Osgood v. El 
Dorado Water & Mining Co., 56 Cal. 571.) From the time 
of the commencement of the work to the time of beneficial 
use the right was considered as incipient and conditional. 
The provisions of the Civil Code enacted in 1872 were sub-
stantially declaratory of the rules laid down in the early 
decisions. (Civ. Code, §§ 1414-1421.) [2] In Inyo Consol. 
Water Co. v. Jess, 161 Cal. 516, the court declared at page 520 
[119 P. 934] that the purpose of the code sections was "to af-
ford a more perfect protection for such rights and to facilitate 
the subsequent acquisition of the title to the use. Previously, 
the incomplete right could be acquired only by some open, vis-
ible work to that end, upon the ground, accompanied by a dec-
laration of the intent. Disputes would naturally arise as to pri-
ority between different diversions from the same stream at 
places far apart. The code endeavors to avoid this by pro-
viding for the posting of a notice at the proposed dam, and 
declaring that such notice secures a prior right, without any 
work, for the period of 60 days thereafter. (Wells v. Mantes, 
99 Cal. 586 [ 34 P. 324].) Thus there is given that which 
it is said did not exist before (Kelly v. Natoma Water Co., 
6 Cal. 105), a constructive right to the use of water, a right 
existing only by publicly declared intent, and which may 
be made a perfect and complete title, as against all except 
prior users and riparian owners, by beginning the work within 
sixty days, diligently prosecuting it to completion, and there-
upon actually using the water. This incomplete right, al-
though not as yet a title, is an interest in the realty." (See 
also Merritt v. City of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 47 [120 P.1064].) 
[3] The Water Commission Act of 1913 and the existing 
provisions of the \Vater Code changed the mechanics of the 
procedure for initiating and completing an appropriation of 
water, but they do not change the attributes of the water rights 
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acquired thereunder. 'l'he filing of an application under the 
present law is comparable and of like effect to the posting 
and recording of notice or commencement of actual construc-
tion work under the rules which had previously prevailed. 
In Y1tba River Power Co. v. Nevada lrr. Dist., 207 Cal. 521 
[279 P. 128], the court had before it the character of the 
water rights acquired under the \Vater Commission Act. 
In speaking of Inyo Consol. Water Co. v. Jess, and Merritt 
v. City of Los Angeles, it is stated in the Yuba River Power 
Company case that, "\Ve cannot distinguish these cases from 
the situation before us. The right being protected and ad-
ministered is the same. A period of priority was provided, 
and the protection given there was during such statutory 
period and prior to any actual construction of diversion 
works." Under the facts appearing in the Yuba River Power 
Company case the plaintiff was entitled to the issuance of a 
permit, although his rights were as yet unperfected. It was 
held that he had a right protected from impairment by 
other claimants, although his right was as yet incomplete 
and conditional. There is nothing in the Yuba City Power 
Company case to indicate that it stands for the proposition 
that the \Vater Commission Act conferred upon an applicant 
thereunder a greater right than had previously been con-
ferred upon one who filed notice under the former rules. 
The Water Code provides that the effect of filing an applica-
tion confers, for all practical purposes, a priority only. 
Section 1450 states: "Any application properly made gives to 
the applicant a priority of right as of the date of the ap-
plication until such application is approved or rejected. Such 
priority continues only so long as the provisions of law and 
the rules and regulations of the department are followed by 
the applicant." 
[4] The issuance of a permit following application still 
does not confer upon the permittee a fully perfected right. 
Section 1455 of the \Vater Code states: "The issuance of a 
permit continues in effect the priority of right as of the date 
of the application and gives the right to take and use the 
amount of water specified in the permit until the issuance or 
the refusal of issuance of a license for the use of water." 
The final procedural step in perfecting a water right is the 
issuance of a license as prescribed in sections 1600 through 
1677 of the Water Code. [5] But the real basis, measure and 
limit of the appropriative right is the actual beneficial use of 
the water. This is inherent in the Constitutional Amendment 
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of 1928 and in section 1240 of the Water Code, which provides: 
''The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial pur-
pose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest 
ceases to use it for such a purpose the right ceases.'' 
[6] It appears from the foregoing that neither the Madera 
Irrigation District nor any other applicant acquired a vested 
right to a permanent supply of water appurtenant to the 
lands of the district by the mere filing of applications for 
the appropriation of water on the San Joaquin River. Such 
right as was acquired was inchoate and incomplete and subject 
to defeasance upon the failure to perfect it in accordance 
with the law. 
As noted, certain defendants appeared who were not 
landowners in the plaintiff district. These defendants were 
landowners within the district at the time the district con-
tracted with the United States for the conveyance of the 
Friant Dam site and other interests. It appears that subse-
quently on their own petition the lands of these defendants, 
comprising some 19,500 acres, were excluded from the district; 
that these landowners intended to form an independent irriga-
tion district and sought to obtain from the plaintiff district 
a proportionate share of the benefits under the 1939 contract, 
particularly a share of the priority right to contract for 
project ·water. Under the present contract the amount of 
priority water to which the Madera Irrigation District was 
entitled under the 1939 contract was reduced in proportion 
to the reduction of acreage in the district since the 1939 con-
tract. But the excluded landowners assert that the United 
States has refused to confer upon them that reduced portion 
of the priority right under the 1939 contract, and that to 
refuse to do so constitutes a deprivation of property without 
due process of law. Their claim >vas asserted as an additional 
ground for the invalidity of the present contract, and the 
trial court so held. 
·whatever may be the rights of the excluded landowners 
under the 1939 contract, it does not appear that they have 
individual rights which may be asserted under the contract 
sought to be validated or to any of the property or rights 
held by the district. [7] Since 1879 the Constitution has 
provided in srction 1, article XIV. that the use of all waters 
"appropriated ... for sale, rental or distribution is hereby 
declared to be a public use .... " No statement is there 
made as to the appurtenance of such waters to the lands 
involved. Under that section of the Constitution the use of 
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waters involved in the present case is a public use. The 
nature of the water right to which a landowner entitled to 
service from an entity which has appropriated waters de-
voted to a public usc, has been the subject of prior litigation 
in this state. In Leavitt v. Lassen Irr. Co. (1909), 157 Cal. 
82 [106 P. 404, 29 L.R.A.N.S. 313], a landowner sought to 
reserve to his private ownership a portion of waters he had 
appropriated for a public use. In holding that he could 
not establish an outright private ovvnership of waters ap-
propriated for a public use, the court relied on the con-
stitutional provision above set forth. It was stated at pages 
89 and 90: "In McCrary v. Beaudry, 67 Cal. 120 [7 P. 264], 
is contained the first statement of this court in construction 
of the constitutional provision: '"Whenever water is appropri-
ated for distribution and sale, the public has a right to use it, 
that is, each member of the community, by paying the rate 
fixed for supplying it, has a right to use a reasonable quantity 
of it, in a reasonable manner.' And in the late case of 
Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 139 Cal. 22 [72 P. 
395], it was said by Mr. ,Justice Shaw, speaking for the court 
in Bank, in defining the public use declared by the constitu-
tion: 'In the ease of a public use, the beneficiaries do not 
possess rights to the waters which are, in the ordinary sense, 
private property. A public use 'must be for the general 
public, or some portion of it, and not a use by or for particular 
individuals, or for the benefit of certain estates.' (McQuillen 
v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202.) ... The right of an individual 
to a p11blic use of water is in the nature of a public right 
possessed by reason of his stat1ts as a person of the class for 
whose benefit the water is appropriated or dedicated. All 
who enter the class may demand the use of the water, regard-
less of whether they have previously enjoyed it or not.' " 
In Miller v. Railroad Com., 9 Cal.2d 190 [70 P.2d 164, 112 
A.L.R. 221], in passing on the nature of the right held by one 
entitled to participate in the distribution of irrigation water 
devoted to a public use, the court stated at page 199: "This 
right is simply a right of service, a right to be furnished 
with water by the utility upon payment of the price, and not 
a water right in the ordinary sense of 'a private freehold 
interest in the freehold of the distributing company.' (Glenn-
Colttsa Irr. Dist. v. Paulson, S1tpra, 75 Cal.App. 57 [242 P. 
494] .) " 
[8] From the foregoing it is established that a land-
owner within an irrigation district does not possess as a 
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part of his freehold estate a proportionate ownership in 
assets of the district. The concept of ownership existing in 
the relationship between a district and a landowner therein 
was further considered in Jenison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500 
[87 P. 62], wherein a landowner sought damages from the 
district for refusing to deliver to him his pro rata share of 
the district's water supply, which he proposed to use on land 
owned by him outside the district. The court in denying relief 
used the following language: "It is apparent that to sustain 
the claim of plaintiff, it must be held that the effect of our 
statutes relative to irrigation districts, is to make each owner 
of land within a district the absolute owner of a proportion-
ate share of the water of the district to which his land 
entitles him, to do with as he sees fit .... It seems very 
clear that such a conclusion would be opposed to the whole 
plan or scheme of the legislation for irrigation districts, con-
verting a district ... into a mere agency for the distribution 
of its water to individuals for use by them outside the dis-
trict for any purpose whatever. . . . Such a construction of 
the provisions of the Irrigation Act entirely ignores the object 
of its enactment." [9] Although the above case dealt 
with lands which never had been within a district, and the 
present case with lands which were once within the plaintiff 
district and later excluded, there is nothing in the law which 
would justify the conclusion that the owners of properly 
excluded lands were possessed of rights which attached to 
their lands. 
Nothing said herein is inconsistent with the cases which 
hold that the members of an irrigation district are the bene-
ficial owners of the water rights of the district. (Merchants 
Nat. Bank v. Escondido Ir1·. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937], 
and cases there cited.) [10] The trust under which water 
rights and other property of an irrigation district is held 
by the district is for the benefit of a particular class of in-
dividuals. Those individuals are the equitable owners. In-
dividual members within that class can demand services to 
which they are entitled if they qualify and as long as they 
qualify as members of that class. 
Questions are raised as to the sufficiency of the notice of 
election whereby the electors of the district were called upon 
to approve or disapprove the proposed contract. The trial 
court concluded that the contract was invalid for lack of 
proper notice. (Wat. Code, § 23223.) These questions need 
not be determined on this appeal for the reason that upon 
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the submission of any further proposed contract to the voters 
in the district, the alleged defects need not recur. 
In accordance with the views expressed herein and in 
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 
824], the judgment is modified by striking therefrom (a) 
that portion which holds that by the mere application for the 
appropriation of water for a public use within the district 
or by actual use by landowners in the district of water being 
furnished by the United States pending negotiations for a 
contract, the landowners of the district acquired a vested 
right appurtenant to their lands entitling them to perpetual 
service as a part of the freehold; (b) that portion which holds 
that an individual landowner, a member of the class entitled 
to the benefits of an irrigation district, acquires any permanent 
right to such benefits appurtenant to his lands when he ceases 
to be a member of that class; (c) those portions of the judg-
ment which hold that the following provisions of the contract 
designed to secure repayment of construction costs to the 
United States are invalid: (1) that part withholding water 
from lands in default of proper charges although the district 
may not be in default as to the United States, (2) that part 
reserving to the United States the right to repossess waste, 
seepage and return flow which escapes or is discharged be-
yond the district boundaries, ( 3) that part limiting changes 
in boundaries, consolidations, mergers and dissolutions during 
the term of the contract and ( 4) that part subjecting all lands 
vFithin the district to ad valorem taxes to defray charges im-
posed by the district. 
As so modified the judgment is affirmed, the respondents 
to recover costs on appeal. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
GIBSON, C. J., Dissenting.-For the reasons stated in my 
dissenting opinion in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, 
p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], I would reverse the judgment. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-This is a companion case to 
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 
824], and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in 
that case, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and 'fraynor, ,J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
